SPACEFLIGHT FIRSTS

Record or milestone

The loss of Space Shuttle Columbia

The claim: Columbia broke apart over Texas during reentry at the end of mission STS-107, killing all seven crew members; damage from a foam strike at launch was the cause, and the accident led to the decision to retire the shuttle

Verified

The STS-107 crew in Columbia's SPACEHAB laboratory, January 2003, a photo found on a roll of unprocessed film that searchers recovered from the debris. Top, in blue: David Brown, William McCool, Michael Anderson. Bottom, in red: Kalpana Chawla, Rick Husband, Laurel Clark, Ilan Ramon
The STS-107 crew in Columbia's SPACEHAB laboratory, January 2003, a photo found on a roll of unprocessed film that searchers recovered from the debris. Top, in blue: David Brown, William McCool, Michael Anderson. Bottom, in red: Kalpana Chawla, Rick Husband, Laurel Clark, Ilan Ramon Image: NASA · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons

On the morning of February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart over Texas as it returned from a 16-day science mission, STS-107. It was about 16 minutes from landing at Kennedy Space Center. All seven crew members were killed: commander Rick Husband, pilot William McCool, payload commander Michael Anderson, mission specialists David Brown, Kalpana Chawla and Laurel Clark, and payload specialist Ilan Ramon, Israel's first astronaut. The damage had been done at launch on January 16, when a piece of foam insulation from the external fuel tank struck the leading edge of Columbia's left wing.

This is a milestone, not a first: the second space shuttle lost with its crew, 17 years after Challenger. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board found that the foam had broken the heat shield on the wing's leading edge, letting superheated air into the wing during reentry. It gave as much weight to NASA's organization as to the foam. Foam had come off the tank on earlier flights and had come to be treated as routine, and engineers' worries during the mission never led to a close look at the wing. The shuttle did not fly again for two and a half years, and the accident led to the decision to retire the fleet once the International Space Station was finished.

The crew

  • Rick D. Husband, commander. An Air Force test pilot on his second flight; he had piloted Discovery on STS-96 in 1999, the first shuttle to dock with the International Space Station.
  • William C. “Willie” McCool, pilot. A Navy test pilot making his first spaceflight.
  • Michael P. Anderson, payload commander. An Air Force officer and physicist in charge of the science program, on his second flight; he had flown to the Russian space station Mir on STS-89 in 1998.
  • David M. Brown, mission specialist. A Navy flight surgeon and naval aviator on his first flight.
  • Kalpana Chawla, mission specialist. An aerospace engineer born in Karnal, India, on her second flight; on STS-87 in 1997 she became the first woman born in India to fly in space.
  • Laurel B. Clark, mission specialist. A Navy flight surgeon and former submarine medical officer on her first flight.
  • Ilan Ramon, payload specialist. A colonel and fighter pilot in the Israeli Air Force, Israel’s first astronaut.

The mission

STS-107 was one of the few shuttle flights of its era that did not go to the space station. After more than two years of delays it launched on January 16, 2003, carrying the SPACEHAB Research Double Module in its payload bay, a pressurized laboratory packed with experiments from NASA, the European Space Agency, companies and universities, and students in Australia, China, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein and the United States. To keep the work going around the clock, the crew split into two shifts, a red team and a blue team, which is why they wore different colored shirts in their in-flight portrait.

The foam strike

At 81.7 seconds after liftoff, as Columbia climbed through about 66,000 feet at more than twice the speed of sound, a piece of foam insulation about the size of a briefcase broke off the external tank near the strut that held the front of the orbiter to the tank. The foam slowed almost at once in the airstream, and the shuttle ran into it at a relative speed of roughly 545 mph. It struck the reinforced carbon-carbon panels that formed the leading edge of the left wing, the part of the heat shield that takes some of the worst heating during reentry.

The strike was not noticed until engineers reviewed launch films the next day. A debris assessment team of NASA and contractor engineers studied it while the crew worked in orbit. Their analysis, using a model built for much smaller pieces of debris, could not rule out serious damage, but the conclusion that reached mission managers was that the strike did not threaten a safe landing. Requests from engineers to have military telescopes or satellites photograph the wing were not pursued. Mission Control told the crew about the strike by e-mail and said it was no concern for reentry.

Reentry, February 1, 2003

Columbia was due to land on Runway 33 at Kennedy Space Center at 9:16 a.m. Eastern time. The times below are Eastern Standard Time.

8:15 a.m.
Over the Indian Ocean, Husband and McCool fire Columbia’s two orbital maneuvering engines for about two and a half minutes to slow the shuttle and begin the descent.
About 8:44
Columbia enters the upper atmosphere over the Pacific. Superheated air, thousands of degrees hot, begins to flow into the breach in the left wing.
8:48:39
A sensor inside the left wing records unusual strain. It goes to the onboard recorder, not to Mission Control.
About 8:53
Over California, people watching the shuttle’s bright trail at dawn see pieces falling away from it.
About 8:54
Flight controllers in Houston see temperature sensors in the left wing stop reporting, one after another.
About 8:58
Tire pressure readings from the left main landing gear drop out. Mission Control calls the crew about the tire messages.
8:59:32
Husband begins to reply, “Roger, uh…” and the transmission ends. It is the last word from Columbia.
About 9:00
Out of control, Columbia breaks apart about 38 miles above north-central Texas, traveling at about 18 times the speed of sound. Observers on the ground see the single trail split into many.

The search

Debris fell along a path stretching across eastern Texas and into Louisiana. More than 25,000 people, from NASA, the Forest Service, other federal and state agencies, and volunteer groups, walked fields and forests in search lines over the following months. Two members of the search effort died when their helicopter crashed in Texas. Searchers recovered more than 84,000 pieces, about 38 percent of the orbiter by weight, along with the remains of the crew. At Kennedy Space Center the pieces were laid out on a grid on a hangar floor in the shape of the orbiter, which helped investigators trace how the wing failed. Searchers also found film and videotape: of 137 rolls of film and 337 tapes aboard, 21 rolls and 28 tapes held recoverable pictures, including the crew’s in-flight portrait above. Pages from Ilan Ramon’s diary were also recovered.

The investigation

NASA set up the Columbia Accident Investigation Board within two hours of losing contact with the shuttle. Chaired by retired Navy Admiral Harold Gehman, the 13-member board worked for nearly seven months. In July 2003, at the Southwest Research Institute in Texas, investigators fired a block of foam at a real wing leading-edge panel at about the speed of the launch strike, and it blew a large hole in the panel. That test settled the physical cause.

The board’s report, released on August 26, 2003, put as much weight on NASA’s organization as on the foam. It found that foam had come off the tank on many earlier flights, and that, with no disaster so far, the agency had come to see it as a maintenance problem rather than a danger. It described a culture that relied on past success, did not invite dissenting views, and was under pressure to meet a schedule for building the space station. It said it heard disturbing echoes of the loss of Challenger. The board made 29 recommendations, 15 of them to be met before the shuttle flew again, and said the nation should replace the shuttle as soon as possible.

What changed

  • The tank. The foam ramp that shed the fatal piece was removed from the external tank design, and foam application was reworked.
  • Inspection in orbit. Every later crew used a 50-foot boom on the robot arm, fitted with a laser and cameras, to scan the wing edges and nose for damage. Before docking, the shuttle flipped end over end so the station crew could photograph its belly.
  • A way out. Crews carried repair kits and practiced heat-shield repairs on spacewalks. For station flights, the station could serve as a shelter while a second shuttle was readied for a rescue.
  • Engineering oversight. NASA created an independent engineering and safety center to give technical problems a voice outside the programs.
  • Return to flight. Discovery flew STS-114 on July 26, 2005. A large piece of foam came off its tank, too, and the shuttle did not fly again until July 2006.
  • The end of the shuttle. In January 2004 the government decided to finish the space station and then retire the shuttle. The last flight, STS-135, landed in July 2011.

Remembrance

A memorial to the Columbia crew stands at Arlington National Cemetery, near the Challenger memorial. In Hemphill, Texas, where much of the debris fell, there is a memorial and a museum, the Patricia Huffman Smith NASA Museum “Remembering Columbia.” Since 2015, Columbia’s recovered cockpit window frames have been on display in the “Forever Remembered” memorial at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex, beside a section of Challenger. The rover Spirit’s team named a range of hills on Mars the Columbia Hills, and seven asteroids carry the crew’s names. NASA keeps the recovered debris at Kennedy, where engineers study it and new employees learn from it. Each January, NASA’s Day of Remembrance honors the crews of Columbia, Challenger and Apollo 1.

Watch

All nine videos are NASA footage in the public domain, hosted on Wikimedia Commons.

The mission

Columbia lifts off on STS-107, January 16, 2003. Low-resolution copy. 2 min 2 s Video: NASA · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons
Ramon, Chawla, Husband and Clark take questions from reporters from Columbia’s flight deck, January 18, 2003. 1 min 20 s Video: NASA · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons
Ilan Ramon shows the student experiments (spiders, silkworms, ants and more) in the SPACEHAB lab, January 25, 2003. 1 min 19 s Video: NASA · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons
A day aboard Columbia, narrated by Rick Husband, January 26, 2003. 2 min 37 s Video: NASA · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons

February 1, 2003

The first video below is the crew’s last recorded footage, found in the debris. It ends several minutes before the breakup. The other two follow Mission Control through the loss of the shuttle.

The crew on the flight deck early in reentry, from a videotape recovered in the debris. 7 min 50 s Video: NASA · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons
Mission Control in Houston during the final minutes, with entry flight director LeRoy Cain. Scanned from VHS. 19 min 44 s Video: NASA · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons
The flight director’s communications loop during the final minutes of the flight. 19 min 50 s Video: NASA · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons

Afterward

NASA briefing by the entry flight director on what Mission Control saw, February 14, 2003. 42 min Video: NASA / Johnson Space Center · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons
Eight years later: a drought in 2011 lowered Lake Nacogdoches, Texas, enough to uncover a tank from Columbia. NASA Kennedy Space Center. 3 min 46 s Video: NASA Kennedy Space Center · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons

Dig deeper

Questions to explore if you want to go further. Each search link opens the question in ChatGPT in a new window.

  1. Why had foam shedding from the external tank come to be accepted as a normal part of flight? search
  2. Could the crew have been rescued or the wing repaired if the damage had been found in orbit? search
  3. What did the Columbia board mean when it said the accident echoed Challenger? search
  4. How do NASA's newer crewed spacecraft guard against the kinds of failures that destroyed Challenger and Columbia? search

Sources

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