Record or milestone
The loss of Space Shuttle Challenger
The claim: Challenger broke apart 73 seconds after liftoff on mission STS-51-L, killing all seven crew members; the investigation that followed reshaped how NASA built, managed and flew the shuttle
Verified

On the morning of January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger lifted off from Pad 39B at Kennedy Space Center on mission STS-51-L. It was the coldest launch the shuttle program had ever tried: about 36°F at ground level, roughly 15 degrees colder than any flight before it. Seventy-three seconds into the climb, at about 46,000 feet, the vehicle broke apart over the Atlantic. All seven people aboard were killed: commander Dick Scobee, pilot Michael Smith, mission specialists Ellison Onizuka, Judith Resnik and Ronald McNair, payload specialist Gregory Jarvis of Hughes Aircraft, and Christa McAuliffe, a New Hampshire social studies teacher flying as the first participant in NASA's Teacher in Space program.
This is a milestone, not a first. It is here because of what it revealed and what it changed. A presidential commission chaired by former Secretary of State William Rogers traced the accident to a failed joint between the two lower segments of the right solid rocket booster, where rubber O-ring seals, stiffened by the cold, let burning gas escape. The commission also found that engineers at the booster's builder, Morton Thiokol, had argued against launching in the cold the night before, and that their warning never reached the officials who gave the final go. The shuttle fleet stayed on the ground for 32 months while the boosters were redesigned and NASA rebuilt its safety oversight.
The crew
- Francis R. “Dick” Scobee, commander. A former Air Force test pilot on his second flight; he had piloted Challenger on STS-41-C in 1984.
- Michael J. Smith, pilot. A Navy aviator and test pilot making his first spaceflight.
- Ellison S. Onizuka, mission specialist. An Air Force flight test engineer who had flown on STS-51-C in 1985, becoming the first Asian American in space.
- Judith A. Resnik, mission specialist. An electrical engineer who had flown on Discovery’s first mission in 1984, the second American woman in space.
- Ronald E. McNair, mission specialist. A laser physicist who had flown on STS-41-B in 1984, the second African American in space.
- Gregory B. Jarvis, payload specialist. A Hughes Aircraft satellite engineer on his first flight, there to run fluid-dynamics experiments.
- S. Christa McAuliffe, payload specialist. A social studies teacher from Concord, New Hampshire, chosen from more than 11,000 applicants to be the first Teacher in Space. She planned to teach two lessons live from orbit.
The mission was to release a NASA tracking and data relay satellite, fly a small free-flying satellite to study Halley’s Comet, and carry out McAuliffe’s lessons. Because a teacher was aboard, schoolchildren across the country were watching.
The 73 seconds
The launch had already been put off several times, and on the night of January 27 the temperature at the Cape fell below freezing. Ice hung on the launch tower that morning. These times come from the presidential commission’s reconstruction of the flight:
- 11:38 a.m. EST
- Liftoff from Pad 39B, with the air at about 36°F.
- 0.678 seconds
- Puffs of dark grey smoke appear at the aft field joint of the right solid rocket booster, the lowest joint between its segments. Eight more follow over the next two seconds, then they stop: the gap had apparently been plugged, at least for the moment.
- About 58.8 seconds
- A small flame appears at the same joint. Within half a second it becomes a steady plume, and the booster’s exhaust begins to play on the external fuel tank and on the strut that holds the booster to it.
- About 70 seconds
- Mission Control calls “go at throttle up,” and Scobee acknowledges. It is the last transmission from the crew.
- About 73 seconds
- The external tank fails. Challenger, flying at nearly twice the speed of sound at about 46,000 feet, is torn apart by aerodynamic forces. The crew cabin, largely intact, falls to the ocean.
- 110 seconds
- The two boosters, still firing and flying on their own, are destroyed by the range safety officer.
Why it happened
Each solid rocket booster was built in segments and joined in the field. At each joint, a lip on one segment (the tang) fitted into a groove on the next (the clevis), sealed by two rubber O-rings and a layer of heat-resistant putty. When the booster ignited, the joint flexed open slightly, and the O-rings had to spring into the gap fast enough to seal it. In the cold they could not. The commission estimated the right booster’s aft joint at about 28°F, and found that at that temperature the rubber recovered too slowly to seal reliably.
The weakness was not new. O-rings had come back scorched or eroded from earlier flights, and in some cases hot gas had blown past the first seal. Because no flight had been lost, the damage came to be accepted as part of normal operations. The commission titled one chapter of its report “An Accident Rooted in History.”
On the evening before launch, engineers at Morton Thiokol, which built the boosters, held a teleconference with NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center and Kennedy. They recommended no launch below 53°F, the coldest temperature at which the boosters had flown before. Marshall managers pushed back. After a private caucus, Thiokol’s senior managers reversed the recommendation over the objections of their own engineers; one was told to “take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat.” The commission found that the launch director and NASA’s top shuttle managers were never told of the dispute.
The investigation
President Ronald Reagan appointed the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident in early February 1986. Alongside its chairman, William P. Rogers, it included Neil Armstrong as vice chairman, Sally Ride, test pilot Chuck Yeager and the physicist Richard Feynman. At a televised hearing, Feynman squeezed a piece of O-ring material in a small clamp, dropped it in a glass of ice water, and showed that it stayed flattened when he let go: in a few seconds he made the cold-weather problem clear to everyone watching.
The commission delivered its report in June 1986. Its conclusion had two parts: a mechanical cause, the failed joint, and a contributing cause, a flawed decision process in which warnings did not travel up the chain. It called for a redesigned joint, an independent safety office reporting to NASA’s top leadership, more astronauts in management, a way for crews to escape a shuttle in controlled gliding flight, and a flight schedule the program could actually sustain. Navy divers recovered the remains of the crew and the crew cabin from the ocean floor in the months after the accident.
What changed
- The boosters. The field joints were redesigned with a third O-ring, a lip that locked the segments together so the joint could not flex open, and heaters to keep the seals warm.
- Safety oversight. NASA created an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance, reporting directly to the administrator.
- Crew escape. Shuttle crews began wearing pressure suits for launch and landing, and orbiters were fitted with a bailout pole so a crew could parachute out during a controlled glide.
- What the shuttle carried. The government ended the shuttle’s role launching commercial satellites, which moved back to expendable rockets.
- A new orbiter. Congress funded a replacement, Endeavour, which first flew in 1992.
- Return to flight. On September 29, 1988, after a 32-month stand-down, Discovery flew STS-26 with an all-veteran crew.
The lessons did not hold for good. When Columbia was lost in 2003, its accident board found that NASA’s culture had again come to accept a known problem, foam striking the orbiter, because it had not yet caused a disaster.
Remembrance
The crew’s families founded the Challenger Center for Space Science Education to carry on the mission’s teaching purpose. A memorial to the crew stands at Arlington National Cemetery. Each year NASA holds a Day of Remembrance in late January for the crews of Apollo 1, Challenger and Columbia and others who died in the cause of exploration. Since June 27, 2015, a section of Challenger’s fuselage has been on public display in the “Forever Remembered” memorial at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex, with personal items from each of the 14 astronauts lost on Challenger and Columbia. In 2018, astronauts on the International Space Station recorded several of the lessons Christa McAuliffe had planned to teach.
Watch
All five videos are NASA footage in the public domain, hosted on Wikimedia Commons. Two of them show the accident itself.











Dig deeper
Questions to explore if you want to go further. Each search link opens the question in ChatGPT in a new window.
- Why did O-ring damage on earlier shuttle flights come to be treated as an acceptable risk? search
- How did the Rogers Commission's findings compare with those of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 17 years later? search
- What exactly changed in the redesigned solid rocket booster joints? search
- How did NASA carry on the Teacher in Space idea after 1986? search
Sources
- Primary Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, ch. 3: The accident (NASA History)
- Primary Rogers Commission report, ch. 4: The cause of the accident (NASA History)
- Primary Rogers Commission report, ch. 5: The contributing cause (NASA History)
- Primary NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance: Challenger STS-51L
- Report Space.com: Space Shuttle Challenger disaster FAQ
- Report Smithsonian Magazine: NASA's new memorial honors lives lost on the Challenger and Columbia missions
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